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458 PEOPLE V. BB,N'fLEY [58 e.2tl 
[Crim. No. 7105. In Bank. S!!pt.27, 1962.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES 
ABNER BENTLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la,lb] Criminal Law - Judgment- Procedure for Determining 
Penalty.~On trial of the penalty phase of a first degree mur-
der case, it was not error to admit eyewitness testimony 
regarding defendant's apparent leadership of a group that 
robbed, kidnapped and attempted to murder a service station 
attendant in another state about a month after the murder in 
question was committed, despitetbe fact that there was 
ample other evidence in the record of defendant's repeated 
criminal behavior, where thel'c was no e\'idence that defendant 
had killed any of his victims before the murder in question 
and the jury was entitled to know that he was not revulsed by 
that killing but was willing to kill again. 
[2] lei. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty. - Pen. 
Code, § 190,1, providing for separate trials of the guilt and 
penalty issues for offenses punishable by death or life im-
prisonment, embodies the broad, liberal rule that has always 
existed of pennitting wide lee\vay in the admission of evidence 
where defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues being 
tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty to be 
imposed. 
[3] lei. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty. - Pen. 
Code, § 190.1, providing for separate trials of the guilt and 
penalty issues for offenses punishable by death or life imprison-
ment, does not limit evidence of background and history or of 
facts in aggravation or mitigation to defendant's activities 
before the crime was committed or to his activities in this 
state. What he has done outside the state or after the crime 
was committed may be as relevant to the issue of penalty as 
what he has done within the state or before the crime was 
committed. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. Harold V. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit 
armed robbery, and for murder. Judgment of conviction im-
posing the death penalty on the murder count, affirmed. 
{I] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §270 et seq. 
Kclt. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Criminal Law, § 1011.1. 
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J. Montgomery Cartcr, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, Raymond M. Momboisse and Edsel W. 
Haws, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendants Bentley, 
Waldo, and Chapple were charged with the crimes of armed 
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , conspiracy to commit armed rob-
bery (Pen. Code, § 182), and murder (Pen. Code, § 187). They 
all pleaded not guilty. Bentley also pleaded not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Thereafter \Valdo and Bentley withdrew 
their pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty. The trial court 
determined that the murder was of the first degree on the 
ground that it was committed in the perpetration of robbery. 
(Pen. Code, § 189.) Neither court nor counsel interpreted 
Bentley's plea of guilty as withdrawing his plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1016.) On that plea, 
a jury determined that Bentley was sane. At the trial on the 
issue of penalty, a second jury fixed his penalty at death and 
Waldo's penalty at life imprisonment. The trial court denied 
Bentley's motion for reduction of the penalty or for a new 
trial on the issue of penalty and entered judgment imposing 
the death penalty. In a separate trial, a jury found Chapple 
guilty of first degree murder and of the other crimes charged. 
The issue of penalty was submitted to the court, which fixed 
his penalty at life imprisonment. Bentley'S appeal is auto-
matic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
On the evening of May 22, 1961, pursuant to a plan to 
commit a robbery, Chapple drove Bentley and \Valdo from 
Chapple's home to a liquor store in Fresno. Chapple's wife 
and small daughter went along. Chapple parked the car 
behind the store. Bentley and Waldo got out and approached 
the proprietor at the front door of his store as he was closing 
it for the ~ight. Bentley fired two shots. One struck the pro-
prietor in the chest and abdomen causing him to fall. Waldo 
then shot him in the head. The wounds were fatal. Waldo and 
Bentley took money and liquor and returned to the waiting 
car. After abandoning a plan to rob another liquor store be-
cause too many people wcre present, they returned to the 
Chapple home. The day before the murder, Chapple, accom-
panied by his wife and child, drove Waldo and Bentley to a 
) 
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liquor store in Modesto where they committed a similar rob-
bery but did not kill the victim. After the murder, Waldo 
and Bentley went to Arizona. 
A careful review of the record establishes that the trial was 
conducted with scrupulous regard for defendants' rights. 
[1 a] Bentley's sole contention ou appeal is that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of a 
criminal venture by him and Waldo in Arizona about a month 
after the murder. He contends that this evidence was inadmis-
sible on the grounds that it related to crimes committed outside 
the state after the crime for which the penalty was being 
determined and that its probative value was outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect. 
Penal Code section 190.1 provides that at the trial on the 
issue of penalty evidence may be presented "of the circum-
stances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background 
and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of 
the penalty." [2] This section "embodies the broad, lib-
eral rule on admission of evidence that has always existed 
where a defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues 
being tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty 
to be imposed. In such cases wide leeway in the admission of 
evidence is permitted. [Citations.]" (People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 
2d 636, 647 [343 P.2d 577].) [3] Section 190.1 does not 
limit evidence of background and history or of facts in aggra-
vatiou or mitigation to the defendant's activities before the 
crime was committed or to his activities in this state. What he 
has done outside the state or after the murder was committed 
may be as relevant to the issue of penalty as what he has 
done within the state or before the murder was committed. 
(See People v. Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 645 [343 P.2d 577]; 
People v. Friend, 50 Ca1.2d 570, 573 [327 P.2d 97] ; People v. 
Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 763 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. Pike, 
ante, pp. 70, 93-95 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656] ; People 
v. Welch, ante, pp. 271, 273 [23 Cal.Rptr. 363, 373 P.2d 
427] ; Pen. Code, § 644.) 
[1 b] In' the present case the People produced evidence 
that Bentley and Waldo cocrced four teen-age boys to accom-
pany them in the commission of the robbery, kidnapping and 
nttempted murder of a service station attendant in Arizona 
about a month after the Fresno murder was committed. As in 
the case of the California crimes, Bentley appeared to be the 
ringleader. He displayed a complete indifference to human 
life, and it was only the victim's tenacity in battling his assail-
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ants that prevented another murder. The People did not seek 
to prove these facts by inadmissible hearsay as in People v. 
Purvis, 56 Ca1.2d 93, 97 [13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713] (see 
also People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 883 [346 P.2d 22]), but 
by the testimony of eyewitnesses. 
Bentley contends, however, that there was ample other evi-
dence in the record of his repeated criminal behavior and 
that the evidence of the Arizona crimes was not only unneces-
sarily cumulative but was presented in such detail as to be 
unduly inflammatory. Although there was evidence that Bent-
ley had committed many armed robberies in the past, there 
was no evidence that he had killed any of his victims before 
the Fresno robbery. The jury was entitled to know that he 
was not revulsed by that killing but was willing to kill again. 
It could consider that willingness for what bearing it might 
have on whether Bentley's shooting of the Fresno victim was 
accidental or intentional; whether it was premeditated or 
occurred on the spur of the moment. Unlike People v. Love, 
53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705], the People did not present 
inflammatory evidence of facts that were already in evidence 
and that were of doubtful relevance at best, but only eye-
witness testimony necessary to establish what Bentley said 
and did in the course of the Arizona crimes. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., and 
Tobriner, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
